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OLD MYTHS AND NEW REALITIES:
UNCOVERING THE IMPLICATIONS OF SENATOR J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT'S MIDDLE
EAST PEACE PLAN
by Angie Maxwell
Faculty Mentor: Sidney Burris
Director, Fulbright College Honors Program

I969 and I970, and specifically to the increasing alliance ofthe
Soviet Union and Egypt, the Fulbright Peace plan offered a
solution not only to the Arab-Israeli conflict, but also to the Cold
War rivalry in the Middle East and to the perceived ineffectiveness
of the United Nations.
The cntcial timing of the release of "Old Myths and New
Realities 11: The Middle East" reflected Fulbright's awareness
that continued attacks between Israel and thefedayeen
(Egyptian-trained Arab fighters) would inevitably draw the
United States into war with the Soviet Union. Angered by a series
ofinadequately implemented peace initiatives resultingfrom the
unstable relationship between the Administration and the State
Department, Fulbright could remain silent no longer. Moreover,
the method of release (the speech was published widely both
domestically and abroad before it was delivered on the Senate
floor) reflected Fulbright's growing frustrations with the
dwindling influence of the United States Congress over foreign
policy decisions. Unfortunately, the proposal was rejected
immediately by Israel and ignored by the administration.
However, it received significant attention from the media.

Angie Maxwell and Sidney Burris

Abstract
OnAugust24,I970, SenatorJ. William Fulbright presented
the speech "Old Myths and New Realities 11: The Middle East"
to the United States Senate. The intent ofthis paper is to uncover
the sign)ficant implications of Senator Fulbright's delivery of
this particular speech at this particular moment in American
History. In brief, Fulbright proposed a bilateral agreement
between the United States and Israel, whereby Israel would
return the conquered Arab lands ofthe I967Warin exchangefor
military protection from the United States. The speech. when
taken out of context, provides a fairly simple plan to initiate
peace in the Middle East. However, in relation to the events of
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Old Myths for New Realities
On August 24,1970, Senator J. William Fulbright presented
the speech "Old Myths and New Realities II: The Middle East"
to the United States Senate. A lengthy thirty-seven pages, the
speech offered a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and
specifically to the increasing alliance of the Soviet Union and
Egypt, an alliance that had peaked in the late summer months of
1970. In brief, Fulbright proposed a bilateral treaty between the
United States and Israel, whereby Israel would return the
conqueredArablandsoftheSix-DayWar(l967)inexchangefor
military protection from the United States. Moreover, the
Fulbright Peace Plan, as it was called. would have to be accepted
and guaranteed by the United Nations Security Council. The
speech, when taken out of con!ext, provides a fairly simple plan
to initiate peace in the Middle East. However, when examined
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in relation to the long series of American foreign policy blunders
in the Middle East, "Old Myths and New Realities ll" reflects the
evolution of the Senator's thought on the conflict. The manner
and timing of the speech· s release are significant factors in
understanding the Senator· s aims and intentions, which included
an explication of his philosophy regarding the role of Congress
in foreign policy decision-making and an avowal of his
dissatisfaction with the secrecy of the Nixon Administration.
Fulbright's involvement in the Middle East stemmed
primarily from his reaction to a succession of foreign-policy
blunders that angered and frustrated him, the result of each
blunder being an increased and alarming Soviet presence in the
region. In 1950, the United States, taking a naive Atlanticist
perspective, signed the Tripartite Declaration with Britain and
France, in which each agreed to "prevent an arms race among the
major local powers in the Middle East, in particular Egypt, Iraq,
and Israel." 1 The declaration ultimately backfired because the
new, powerful Prime MinisterofEgypt 'Abd al-Nassir (Nasser),
having knowledge of the agreement, turned to the Soviet Union
for military aid. The military aid would prove necessary in the
1956 Suez Crisis. In December of 1955, under the leadership of
President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles offered $56 million to Egypt to fund the Aswan Dam
project, part of Nasser's campaign to modernize the state.
Nasser, hoping for a better offer from the Soviets, did not
respond to Dulles. Aggravated, Dulles hastily withdrew the
offer. In order to fund the Dam on his own, Nasser nationalized
the Universal Suez Canal Company, startling theWestern allies.
Desperate, the British and French joined the Israeli attack on the
fedayeen (Egyptian-trained Arab fighters) that was already in
progress. The Eisenhower Administrationcalledforanimmediate
cease-fire; European influence in the region completely
disintegrated. The Soviets, sensing an opportunity to extend
their influence, offered to participate in the Aswan Dam project
which "alarmed Washington officials.' 01 Fulbright blamed Dulles
for causing the conflict and called for an immediate Senate
investigation.
In 1970, the possibility of a superpower conflict in the
Middle East reached a volatile level. The Soviet Union, by this
time, had deployed 15,000 military personnel to Egypt. Nasser,
now the recognized leader of the Arab Nationalist movement and
founder of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, had begun a
war of attrition along the Israeli-Egyptian border. In July, Israeli
Prime Minister Golda Meir told President Nixon that Israel had
installed SA-2 and SA-3 batteries along the border. The
Administration panicked, realizing that the slightest sign of
aggression by the Arabs could result in a direct confrontation
between Israel and the Soviet forces that were now dominant in
the Sinai. Within days of Meir' s warning, Israeli Phantom jets
came under fire in the Canal Zone. Secretary of State William
Rogers negotiated a cease-fire that began on August 7, 1970.
However, on August 13, 1970, Israeli intelligence revealed that
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Nasser and the Soviets had moved additional weapons into the
standstill zone. The United States had no evidence to prove that
these movements had occurred because the State Department
failed to order U-2 reconnaissance planes to photograph the area
on the day that the cease-fire was implemented. Israel was
outraged by the poor planning and grew increasingly desperate
due to the lack of American action against these violations. The
mistake increased the urgency of the Arab-Israeli conflict-one
factor that prompted the Senator to make his most extensive
commentary on the Middle East that August.
Furthermore, Israel and Egypt, as part of the cease-fire
compromise, agreed to enter into negotiations under the auspices
of the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Gunnar
Jarring. Fulbright did not want to see the Administration force
a quick solution to the conflict, as had occurred in the aftermath
of the Suez Crisis. Rather, the Senator believed in public
discussion of major foreign policy decisions, and he believed
that Congress provided the appropriate arena for this type of
discussion. Thus, an elaborate effort to release the speech both
in abstract form and in its entirety was undertaken by the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee staff (Fulbright served as chairman
of the SFRC from 1959 until 1974). An advance copy was
forwarded to Secretary of State Rogers with a personal note from
the Senator that stated flatly, "I have just finished this. I hope it
may be helpful to you. If not denounce it."3 A briefing was held
for all major media, and excerpts of the speech ran in the
Washington Post and the New York Times. The excerpts ran one
day prior to the delivery of the speech on the Senate floor and two
days prior to the start of the Jarring negotiations. Indeed,
Fulbright intended to exert his influence and encourage a debate
on all levels from the mass public, to the media, to the
Administration. Fulbright's insistence that any further peace
initiatives for the Middle East be discussed in Congress reflected
his growing frustration with the lack of communication between
Congress and the Administration.
In truth, Fulbright's frustration began with the Eisenhower
Administration during the 1950's. On January 5, 1957, the
AdministrationintroducedJoint Resolution 19 which authorized
the President to employ the Armed Forces at any time to protect
the nations of the Middle East from international communism.
Fulbright vehemently opposed this resolution because it granted
unprecedented freedom to the Executive Branch with regards to
foreign policy. As debate continued, Fulbright delivered an
impassioned speech against the resolution, calling it a "blank
check."4 The speech marked the beginning of Fulbright's public
campaign against the American policy on the Middle East.
However, the Administration implored Congress not to deny the
President the ability to protect American national security. On
March5, 1957,JointResolution 19-the Eisenhower Doctrinepassed. In the next two years the Doctrine was applied to three
separate crises in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. The quick
succession of these events over a two-year period, without the
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consent of Congress, fostered an unprecedented sense of instability
and marked a turning point in the history of the Senator's
involvement in the conflict. Each of the crises backfired against
the United States, increasing Soviet influence in the region, and
accordingly, Fulbright marked each event with continued criticism
on the Senate floor. As the Arab-Israeli conflict erupted again in
1970, Fulbright resumed his condemnation of unchecked
Executive power. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee
moved to revoke the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution-which allowed Johnson to intervene in
Vietnam-as a symbolic statement that Congress should not be
by-passed in foreign policy making. The revelation of the secret
attack on Cambodia in May of 1970 only antagonized the feeling
of distrust that Fulbright had for the Nixon administration, in
particular. This distrust,in addition to the foreign-policy blunders
aforementioned, motivated the Senator to offer the Fulbright
Peace Plan, though he knew it would prove controversial.
The plan, as previously stated, consisted of both a bilateral
agreement between the United States and Israel and a multilateral
agreement through the United Nations. According to the Senator's
reasoning, each piece was necessary to a peaceful solution in the
Middle East. The bilateral agreement addressed what Fulbright
considered to be the root of the conflict-Israeli insecurity. He
believed that if Israel's statehood were protected, it would
relinquish the conquered territories of the 1967 War. The
multilateral agreement would ensure Soviet support of the
proposal, since it would have to be passed by the Security
Council. Fulbright reasoned that all the Soviets really desired
was a role in the decision-making process. Furthermore, if the
United Nations was entrusted to secure peace in the region, its
reputation could be revived-a reputation that had suffered from
several unenforceable resolutions such as Resolution 242 which
ended the 1967 War and called for Israeli withdraw from the
occupied Arab territories. Thus, the proposal serves as a clear
example of Fulbright's characteristic methodology-his unique
way ofproceeding-whereby the microscopic focus on a specific
problem (the crises in the Middle East) is seen within the realm
of a macroscopic goal (the renovation of the United Nations and
the sustained balance of power of the Cold War); such a process
of thought belongs recognizably to Fulbright.
The bevy of articles that appeared after the release of
"Old Myths and New Realities If' ranged from vehement criticism
to unprecedented applause. The media focused on two primary
points of contention-the proposal's feasibility and its
inconsistency with regard to the Senator's position on Vietnam.
Critics were correct in their analysis that Israel would not accept
the proposal. Fulbright ignored the violation of the cease-fire in
his speech, and in an attempt to offer an even-handed policy,
Fulbright alienated Israel with his considerate treatment of the
Soviets. Other journalists called the Senator a hypocrite for
denouncing American involvement in Vietnam, yet offering
American troops to protect Israel. However, Fulbright's
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supporters in the media proclaimed him to be 'The Signalman
Senator" who examined each foreign policy situation in its own
right, without the influence of the Jewish lobby. 5 Syndicated
columnist Walter Lippmann noted Fulbright's prophetic status,
stating that "it has been said of him [Fulbright] that all too often
he was right too soon."6 Indeed, as the Arab-Israeli conflict
continues to claim lives today, Fulbright's proposal was reiterated
in his own speeches, as well as in the Brookings Report on the
Middle East and the American-Soviet Joint Resolution on Peace
in the Middle East.
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Faculty Comments:
Faculty Mentor Sidney Burris comments:
First of all, Ms. Maxwellhasidentifiedanaspectofthe
Senator's career that still generates much
discussion-his opinion on the Arab-Israeli conflict.
And she has chosen to analyze one of the central
documents that delves into this opinion-his speech,
entitled "Old Myths and New Realities II: The Middle
East." There is focus to her project; and, yet as she
situates the speech within the long history of American
relations with the Middle East, there is ample scope as
well. The thesis itself, for which the current manuscript
is essentially a precis, runs over fifty pages. In
reconstructing the background of the speech, Ms.
Maxwell has educated herself in the making of a
historical narrative, and she has adroitly handled the
chronological intricacies, the give-and-take of
diplomatic negotiations, that characterized this
particular segment of American history. Her work is
important because it brings the Byzantine complexity
of our Middle East negotiations to bear on the equally
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complex structure of thought that lies behind the
Senator's speech and so provides a helpful bridge
between the informing history and the resulting
speech-and this had not previously been done with
the same detailed focus that characterizes her
approach.
Second, her work has admirably accomplished one of
the primary goals that the Honors Program originally
envisioned with the required Honors thesis-Ms.
Maxwell has plunged herself into the rigors of
scholarly research; and, as a glance through her
bibliography will show, she has consulted an array of
primary sources, including the Fulbright manuscripts
in our collection, the Congressional Record in
Washington, D.C., interviews with three of the
Senator's aides, writers, and press secretaries (Tillman,
Williams, and Purvis), as well as the standard
secondary sources. And she has carefully collated the
material, sifting through the contradictory accounts,
and gradually built the coherent picture that
characterizes both this project and her thesis from
which this project is drawn. She has quite quickly
learned the necessity of making accurate historical
judgments based on the available evidence, and her
approach in each instance has been conservative-no
conclusions are drawn where they are not clearly
warranted by the material at hand. My training, of
course, is in English; and, to direct this thesis and to
keep pace with Ms. Maxwell, I have had to do much
of the reading that she did, and I can attest to the
mountain of information that she has read and
digested. It is not that the analysis of a single speech
shows extraordinary ambition; it is that the large
volume of information that she consulted in reference
to the single speechrevealsher characteristic ambition
to leave no stone untumed. As a researcher, she has
been absolutely thorough and uncompromising in
her use of sources.
Finally, I would point to the quality of her prose. As
the project has progressed through successive drafts,
she has moved closer and closer to achieving the kind
of limpid style thatitseems to me most befits historical
narrative of this sort. Never self-<:onscious, her prose
has become more and more adept at deftly handling
the date-driven narrative that often characterizes
diplomatic history. She has worked hard to effect a
balance between chronological accuracy and narrative
liveliness. And in my opinion she has largely
succeeded-the achievement of a prose style, which is
already well within her grasp, is another of this
project's accomplishments.

Hoyt Purvis, Director of the Fulbright Institute of Intemational Relations says of the work:
By any measure Ms. Maxwell's study is exceptionally
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fine and accomplished work, and for an undergraduate
student it represents an extraordinary contribution.
Ms. Maxwell has studied and analyzed an important
but relatively unexamined chapter in Senator
Fulbright's history as a leading figure in American
foreign policy and international relations. In the
process she offers some valuable insight into
Fulbright's views, his mode of operation, his strategy
for attempting to influence the debate on U.S. policy
in the Middle East, his efforts to use the media, and his
relations with the Nixon Administration.
The historical context, background, and overall
perspective of American foreign policy of the era is an
especially strong feature of her work. She displays a
clear understanding of what was important in the
development of U.S. policy in the region and of
Fulbaght's role. Her analysis and her interpretation
are solid, well-founded, and persuasive.
Altogether she has done a highly impressive job of
research and writing. Her mastery of the background
and context is clear. Her research in the Fulbright
Papers, as well as the interviews she conducted with
Seth Tillman and Lee Williams, brings an especially
valuable dimension to the work.
As a professor of international relations and as one
who was involved in working with Senator Fulbright
at the time of his 1970 speech, I find this to be a
sophisticated, well-written, and insightful work of
scholarship. It is clearly worthy of honor.

Fulbright scholar, Distinguished Professor of Diplomacy,
and Dean of Fulbright College, Randall B. Woods, remarks:
I am writing to endorse, with great enthusiasm, Ms.
Maxwell's project, "Old Myths and New Realities:
Uncovering the Implications of Senator J. William
Fulbright's 1970 Peace Plan for the Middle East." I
have spoken with her at some length about it, and her
conception of the senator's fundamental philosophy
regarding the United States' relation with Israel and
the Middle East is both sound and penetrating. By
examining the senator's proposal to send American
troops into Israel in exchange for the resumption of
their original pre-1967borders-the senator proposed
this while he advocated withdrawing troops from
Vietnam-Ms. J.l.1axwellhas isolated a sterling example
of Fulbright's special brand of pragmatism.
Conformity to historical precedent and consistency
with an intellectual tradition, while they are worthy
concerns for a history professor, can yield disastrous
results in foreign policy. But the fact stubbornly
remains that many of Fulbright's critics have
heretofore missed this fundamental point. Senator
Fulbright, however, did not, and Ms. Maxwell's
project, while surgically directed toward a specific
phase in the senator's career, will shed light on his
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entire political philosophy. And it will correct what
has become over the years a substantial misconception
concerning a vital area of his thinking on international
relations. In my judgment, it is a project of real
importance that deserves publication.

''•

The research that she has already completed reveals
thekindofmaturityseldomseeninanundergraduate.
Last spring, before she left campus for the summer,
she introduced herself to the Fulbright archivist in
MullinsUbrary,obtainedthecredentialsnecessaryto
work with the manuscript collection, and became
acquainted with the collection's basic layout-and she
did this several months in anticipation of the project's
beginning stages. She has now mastered the navigation
of the collection. And, while she was in Washington
this past summer, she began reading the relevant
speeches in the Ubrary of Congress. She returned to
Washington during spring break to interview both
Dr. Seth Tillman, Fulbright's ghostwriter, and Lee
Williams, Fulbright's former Chief-of-Staff. I cannot
honestly say that I know of a more disciplined and
motivated scholar at the undergraduate level than
Ms. Maxwell, particularly in a field where the sources
for her work are so voluminous and unwieldy. Many
older, more seasoned scholars would be overwhelmed
by the sheer amount of material that is available, but
Ms. Maxwell has gone through the relevant material
with purpose and dedication. Perhaps even more
impressive,however, than this substantial preparation
is Ms. Maxwell's knowledge of Arabic. She will be
able to consult a range of primary materials that
previous Fulbright scholars, becauseoftheirignorance
of the language, have been unable to examine. This
knowledge of Arabic alone gives Ms. Maxwell a clear
advantage over many of the reputable scholars who
are currently working on Fulbright, and I eagerly
anticipate the results of her research into this fertile
area.
Since her junior year, Ms. Max\vellhas won a Truman
Fellowship, the FulbrightCollege Prize for Distinction
in the Liberal Arts, and The Johns Hopkins Essay
Contest. Most recently, she was appointed to the
USA-Today Academic All-American Second Team,
and in December of 1999 she was awarded a
SILO-SURF grant to complete her work on Fulbright,
an indication of the overall merit of her project.
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